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When we last left the now notorious and long-running Celmer saga, the High Court
of Ireland in its fourth outing had held that it needed to ultimately determine if there
were substantial grounds for believing that Mr Celmer was at real risk of a breach of
his fundamental right to an independent tribunal. To do that, the Court had to elicit
additional information from the Polish judicial authorities and enter into dialogue with
them in order to obtain further information about this risk. On 19 November 2018, in
what now appears to be the final outing before the High Court of Ireland, subject to
any appeals that may flow from the decision, Donnelly J gave her fifth judgment and
concluded that the real risk of a flagrant denial of justice has not been established
by Mr Celmer and ordered that he be surrendered on foot of the European Arrest
Warrants (EAWs) issued against him. Given that Donnelly J had, as a matter of fact,
initially found that there were ‘breaches of the common value of the rule of law’ in
Minister for Justice and Equality v Celmer (No 1) [2018] IEHC 119, this came as
some surprise.
The Legal Tests
As set out in her judgment, Donnelly J had requested further information from the
issuing judicial authorities in Poland pursuant to Article 15 of Council Framework
Decision 2002/584/JHA. The issuing judicial authority was asked that they would
comment specifically on a number of contentious issues, including the general
situation of the rule of law in Poland, the removal of presidents and vice-presidents
of the Ordinary Courts in general and specifically, the remarks of the Deputy Minister
for Justice relating to the Respondent, and what effect, if any, the removal of the
court presidents might have on the trial of Mr Celmer. On this basis, Donnelly J had
to make a factual determination on all the information and evidence before her, in
accordance with the principles set out in Case C-216/18 PPU LM.
Initially, Donnelly J dealt with some housekeeping matters, of interest in the practical
implementation of LM, such as the relevant legal and evidential tests to be applied
when establishing the extent and degree of the denial of a fair trial. She held that
the applicable standard was that of a flagrant denial of justice, as set out in LM
and that the burden of proof in establishing substantial or reasonable grounds
giving rise to a real risk rests on the Respondent.  Given the primacy of mutual
trust within the Framework Decision and the CJEU’s conclusion that it is only in
exceptional cases that a check can be made on whether fundamental rights have
been breached, this was a high threshold. The fundamental overarching question to
be factually determined was if systemic deficiencies in the common values of the rule
of law arising from a lack of independence of the judiciary are found to exist and if –
following a specific and precise assessment into the particular circumstances of the
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case – there are substantial grounds for believing that the Respondent would be at
risk of an unfair trial.
Systemic Deficiencies
Donnelly J began by examining whether systemic deficiencies in and of themselves
could amount to a flagrant denial of justice. Specifically, she found that it was
clear that the CJEU in LM expressly did not accept that a finding of systemic and
generalised breaches was sufficient to establish that the individual concerned will run
the risk of a breach of the essence of the fundamental right to a fair trial. This was
copper-fastened in her view by the CJEU’s statement that even if the deficiencies
are found to operate systemically, the executing judicial authority was still required
to assess specifically and precisely whether there were substantial grounds for
believing that the person in question will run a real risk of breach of his fundamental
right to a fair trial. Both Donnelly J’s and the CJEU’s reasoning here seems coherent
– as Donnelly J set out the test is one of the essence of the fundamental right to
a fair trial. In circumstances where such systemic and generalised breaches were
so egregious, it would be likely an individual could establish they were individually
affected. Where this is more nuanced and less clear, given the threshold of mutual
trust between Member States, a precise and individual assessment must be
mandated.
Donnelly J then proceeded to examine the submissions and additional information
provided by the issuing authority. Most interesting and marked were the contrasting
replies from the issuing authorities, from President of the Warsaw Regional Court
Judge Joanna Bitner and from Judge Piotr Gaciarek, named on the warrant issued
by the Warsaw Regional Court as the representative of the issuing judicial authority.
There is a clear dispute between Judges Bitner and Gacierek as to who is to
represent the Warsaw issuing authority, and, as Donnelly J pithily notes, the dispute
only highlights the considerable tensions that the recent legislative changes have
wrought amongst the Polish judiciary. In short, Judge Bitner provides the statist
position, submitting that amongst other points, there is no risk of a violation by Polish
courts of the guarantee of a fair trial. On the other hand, Judge Gaciarek asserts that
it is not true that there are no risks for independence of judges and courts in Poland
and his concerns mirror those of the EU Commission.
Specific and Precise Assessment
With these considerations in mind, Donnelly J finally came to deciding whether the
Respondent had met the threshold of the test set out in LM. First, she concluded
that in light of evidence before her, there was a real risk of the fundamental right to a
fair trial being breached,  based on the lack of independence of the courts of Poland
on account of systemic or generalised deficiencies there. Next, she examined if
the Respondent himself would face a flagrant denial of justice due to the general
situation in Poland, due to the serious charges he faced, and due to the specific
comments of the Deputy Minister of Justice.
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In relation to the general situation in Poland, Donnelly J reiterated her initial
observations on systemic and generalised risks being insufficient to ground a real
risk. She further buttressed this point with reference to the absence of available
qualitative or anecdotal evidence on the lack of fairness since the changes,
regardless of those changes themselves. She however rejected the Respondent’s
contention in relation to the nature of his charges on the same basis. Finally, she
turned to the comments of the Deputy Minister of Justice, where he made prejudicial
comments referring to the Respondent as “a dangerous” “criminal sought in the
whole of Europe” “from a drug mafia”. This was arguably the Respondent’s strongest
and most individualised argument. On the basis of the information from the Polish
judiciary, Donnelly J noted that statements of public officials were not to be taken
into account in the decision making process. Both Judges Butner and Garcierek had
highlighted how such comments appear to be a regular occurrence In Poland “on
almost a daily basis” and, according to Judge Garcierek, “should be perceived as a
typical rhetoric of politicians currently in power, who build their position among voters
based on illegitimate and unjust attacks on courts and judges.” However, despite this
Donnelly J continued that in light of all the evidence the Deputy Minister of Justice’s
comments did not give rise to a real risk that this respondent will face a flagrant
denial of his right to a fair trial. It was the, somewhat perversely, normalisation of
what in many jurisdictions would be considered deeply prejudicial comments that
ameliorated their potential adverse effect.
What Next?
Finally, Donnelly J notes that the execution of EAWs is a matter of applying Union
law and not of applying Polish law. It is the mutual trust that each Member State
places in another Member State’s sharing of common values on which the EU is
founded. However, the right, and indeed the duty in certain circumstances, for a
court to examine whether a requested person can receive a fair trial in a Member
State has been confirmed by the CJEU. And where the test in LM is met the
executing judicial authorities may not be bound by the principles of mutual trust.
Possibly the most interesting statement of all was in the very last paragraph of
the lengthy judgment, which may perhaps give pause for thought to the Polish
authorities and the Respondent and it is worth quoting in full:
Finally, it is important to state that it is the courts of Poland and, perhaps if he
were to be convicted and have that conviction upheld on appeal, the European
Court of Human Rights, that will have to decide whether any trial of this respondent
actually meets the Polish and ECHR standards respectively of right to a fair trial
before an independent and impartial judiciary. This Court has been concerned only
with whether the relevant threshold preventing surrender has been reached, in
accordance with the principles laid down by the Court of Justice of the European
Union. That threshold, which is a high one under the law of extradition/surrender,
has not been reached on the evidence before this Court.
As noted before, and as Matteo Bonelli has written, the Irish proceedings really
are only the starter, with the pending infringement actions (on the Ordinary
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Courts and on the Law on the Supreme Court) and the proceedings under Article 7
TEU as the main course. This decision has avoided the ensuing diplomatic fallout
and the potential for EAW transfers between Poland and Ireland to grind to a halt
only for now. But, as noted in her final paragraph, Donnelly J was only concerned
with the high threshold set in LM on the prevention of surrender, not with whether the
Respondent’s trial substantively meets the requirements of Article 6 of the ECHR.
Any proceedings that the Respondent may wish to take to the European Court of
Human Rights, should he be convicted, may well provide the dessert.
The judgment is compelling for a number of reasons, not least in that it averts a
collision between Member States for now, but primarily for the glaring disparateness
between the factual findings of the Court in relation to the rule of law in Poland
initially in Celmer (No 1) and its final determination. Fairly, it is quite a faithful
application of the test in LM and any critique of the case in relation to the test should
more appropriately be levelled at the CJEU. The High Court decision vindicates in a
way the purposely difficult standard created by the CJEU as a means of avoiding any
direct confrontation between the political process envisaged under Art. 7 TEU and
the role of the Court. That said, the judgment is somewhat disappointing insofar as
it arguably fails to vindicate the Respondent’s fair trial rights and begs the question
what exactly would it take for the threshold of the Framework to be met if the terms
of the Polish judicial changes do not? Perhaps however, Donnelly J is savvy to
allow this issue to be ultimately resolved by the ECtHR – this would facilitate a more
neutral arms-length determination of the rule of law issues without inflaming the
internal politics of the Union.
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